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FEATURE
ARTICLES
The Consumer Advocates v. the
Banks: Public Debate of Regulation
Issues Survives Passage of the Financial Services Modernization Act
Don Allen Resnikoff

Introduction
The Financial Services Modernization Act of 19992
was signed into law by President Clinton on November
12, 1999. The new law permitted banks to do securities
and insurance business, two areas where as a general rule
banks were not allowed. The reform law repeals 1930's
Depression era law, particularly the Glass-Steagall Act 3,
that separated the business of commercial banking from
other businesses.
When Congress considered this financial services
reform legislation, consumer advocates used this opportunity to argue for regulation to solve perceived consumer problems. Many of the issues argued by the advocates were not resolved by passage of the legislation.
Some surviving issues have immediate impact on the
wallets of consumers and taxpayers. These "pocketbook"
issues include high bank fees to customers, bank protection of customer privacy, and Community Reinvestment
Act obligations of financial institutions to poor communities. Also surviving is a series of issues concerning the
safety and soundness of the country's financial institutions.
This article focuses on the continuing debate of the
above issues.
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Consumer advocates and bankers generally have
opposing views on the need for regulation of financial
services. Consumer advocates frequently recommend
government regulation to meet perceived problems.
Bankers generally oppose regulation, arguing that market forces usually solve consumer problems, and that
failures in operation of the market should be met with
the narrowest possible government intervention.
There are legitimate reasons to be interested in the
ongoing arguments between consumer advocates and
banking interests. Consumers need to be aware of instances where financial institutions may cause them
harm. The aware consumer can shop for better services,
take positions on relevant public policy questions, or
consider other remedies.
Financial institutions need to take the measure of
particular consumer arguments and consider the consequences should the public strongly support them. Although it is uncertain whether and when the general
public will become strongly concerned about any particular consumer argument, the banking business could
be inviting trouble by ignoring possible public outcries.
Legislators and policy makers interested in balanced issue resolution need to consider the character of
the ongoing debates. Consumer advocates and banking
interests generally present sharply conflicting arguments
on particular regulation issues. The arguments reflect
opposing philosophies concerning need for regulation
and may be difficult to resolve.
Before considering the debates between consumer
and banking institution advocates on particular issues,
this article discusses the role of consumer advocates in
the recent Congressional debate of financial deregulation.
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The role of consumer organizations in debate
of the recent financial reform law
Consumer advocacy organizations frequently
testified to Congressional committees as Congress deliberated passage of what would be the Financial Modernization Act. The issues the advocates pressed most vigorously were pocketbook issues with obvious impact on
ordinary people. The pocketbook issues included the
following: (1) the high price of bank fees to customers for
ATM and other services; (2) customer privacy rights with
regard to information held by banks; and (3) Community
Reinvestment Act issues concerning the obligation of
financial institutions to invest in poor communities.
To a lesser extent, consumer advocates addressed
the broader issues of the sufficiency of regulation to
protect the nation's major financial institutions and the
nation's economy. First, will the regulatory structure,
particularly Federal Deposit Insurance provisions, be
adequate to preserve the safety and soundness of the
country's various financial institutions? Next, will the
new multi-product institutions permitted by the new
legislation be "too big to fail?" In other words, institutions so big that in the event of their business failure, the
economy would be profoundly affected forcing the
government to use great amounts of taxpayer money to
bail them out. Finally, will the mixing together of commerce and banking activities in one enterprise create
incentives for "crony capitalism," the kind of imprudent
lending to closely related businesses that is often blamed
for recent Asian bank failures?

Outline of the discussion to follow
This article next discusses each of the preceding
series of issues brought to the attention of Congress by
consumer advocates. Discussion of each issue begins
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with review of arguments of the advocates. The discussion then focuses on the debate likely to occur in the
future. After reviewing the debates on particular issues,
the article turns to topics that provide context. These
topics include the following: (1) the recent disengagement of the general public from banking issues; and (2)
an overview of the issues of financial institution deregulation.
A. "Pocketbook" Issues
1. High Bank Fees
Arguments made to Congress concerninghigh bank fees
Ralph Nader testified to a Senate Committee in
June 1998 and offered his vision of vigorous financial
services regulations. These regulations would be efficiently carried out by a single agency resulting in low
4
cost financial institution services to the public.
With regard to bank fees, he concluded that fees
imposed by banks have become a disgrace because few, if
5
any, are based on costs.
Mary Griffin, of Consumers Union, reported to a
Congressional committee the following information:
In a 1996 study, Consumer Reports identified 100 separate fees that banks now impose on consumers. The size of those
charges has been rising at better than twice
the rate of inflation, jumping more than 50
percent on checking accounts between 1990
and 1996.6
Ed Mierzewski, U.S. Public Interest Research
Group's Consumer Program Director, argued to Congress' House Banking Committee that bigger banks
means bigger fees. Both PIRG and Federal Reserve Bank
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fee studies have confirmed that bigger banks use monopoly muscle to charge their customers higher fees than
7
small banks and credit unions do.
The Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999
generally does not meet the concerns about fees expressed to Congress by consumer advocates. For example, with regard to ATM fees, the new law simply
requires notice to consumers by any automated teller
machine operator who imposes a fee for providing host
transfer services.8 The fee notice, to be provided at the
time of the ATM transaction, is intended to permit the
consumer to choose another less expensive service provider.
The prospectsfor future debate on bank fees
Debate on bank fees continues. President Clinton
has advocated a plan for low-cost bank accounts that
responds to the wish of consumer advocates for low fees.
He expressed concern that far too many families have no
bank accounts at all. 9
The Washington Post reports that from ATM fees to
bounced-check charges to credit-card late fees, fees have
become so numerous and so high that in some cases they
have become a political issue.1" The American Banker
reports, "A movement against ATM surcharges appears
to be picking up steam across the nation.""
Donald G. Ogilvie, executive vice president of the
American Bankers Association, argues that no business
should be expected to provide free services to non-customers. Mr. Ogilvie explains that federal law is on the
side of the banks with regard to local regulation of ATM
fees:
There's already legislation that makes these
municipal laws [prohibiting ATM use fees]
illegal. The comptroller of the currency, which
regulates national banks, has the authority
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and we believe will intervene to overturn
these ordinances violating the National Bank
Act. Efforts two or three years ago in Congress to bar these fees did not get any trac12
tion.
The relationship between litigation and politics
was discussed in an editorial in The Atlanta JournalConstitution. 13 The editorial states that national banks
argue that because federal law regulates them, local
governments cannot regulate ATM fees. 4 The editorial
then suggests that the issue is as much one of politics as
law. 5 The editorial notes recent introduction of legislation in Congress that would help to regulate ATM fees. 6
The issues of law and policy raised by high bank
fees are two-sided, but it is hard to argue with the suggestion that the connection between public complaints
and the possibility of new federal regulation is largely
one of politics. There is no obvious legal obstacle to new
federal law regulating aspects of the electronic payment
system.
2. Customer Privacy Rights
Arguments made to Congress concerningprivacy rights
Consumer advocates argued to Congress that a
bank should not be allowed to share a customer's financial information with insurance or securities broker
affiliates. In July 1999, Edmund Mierzwinski testified to
Congress about privacy issues, speaking on behalf of
Consumer Federation of America, Consumers Union, as
well as U.S. PIRG.17 He pointed out that numerous surveys, such as the recent AARP reports, have documented
that consumers value their financial privacy. 8 He argued
that Congress should enact legislation that does the
following:
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Gives consumers the right to opt-in for all information sharing for secondary purposes, whether
to affiliates or to third parties.
Gives consumers clear notice and full disclosure of
a bank's privacy policies for both affiliate and
third party sharing and of the consumer's right to
choose.
Provides consumers with enforceable legal rights
against violators. 9
Mr. Mierzwinski explained that both affiliates and
third parties make privacy invasions. 20 Failing to give
consumers control over their information when it is
shared among affiliates is failing to solve the problem.
The November 1999 Financial Services Modernization Act does not satisfy consumer advocates' points. It
provides, in part, that generally "a financial institution
may not, directly or through any affiliate, disclose to a
non-affiliated third party any nonpublic personal information, unless such financial institution provides or has
21
provided to the consumer notice..." [emphasis added]

The prospectsfor future debate on privacy
Debate about financial institution privacy policies
continues. Senator Paul Sarbanes said, "The issue of
privacy will not go away with the passage of this legislation [The Financial Services Modernization Act]."' President Clinton, speaking at the bill signing ceremony for
the Financial Services Modernization Act, said,
I do not believe that the privacy protections
go far enough. I am pleased the act actually
instructs the Treasury to study privacy
practices in the financial services industry,
and to recommend further legislative steps.
Today, I'm directing the National Economic
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Council to work with Treasury and OMB to
complete that study and give us a legislative proposal that the Congress can consider next year.
State legislatures are reportedly considering financial institution privacy laws that would impose harder
restrictions on banks than the federal financial reform
law signed Nov. 12 by President Clinton.23 Others in the
news industry have declared that state "privacy laws
may be set to spread like wildfire."24
3. Community Reinvestment Act Issues
Arguments made to Congress concerning Community Reinvestment Act issues
The Community Reinvestment Act ("CRA") requires that regulators review the adequacy of financial
institution lending into poor communities. Recent Congressional debate of financial services reform included
questions of the reach and underlying fairness of the
CRA.
A number of consumer advocates testified to
Congress in support of strengthening CRA requirements.
Mary Griffin of Consumer's Union testified:
Banks should not be permitted to avoid
CRA obligations when their affiliates conduct lending activity. All lending activity
conducted by banks and their affiliates
should come under the CRA. As insurance
companies and securities firms merge with
depository institutions, they should come
under obligations comparable to the federal
CRA and other obligations of the type
applied to banks. 25
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Consumer advocate Ralph Nader similarly argued
that new financial reform law should expand CRA coverage to the new insurance and brokerage activities of
banks.
At one point Congressional wrangling over CRA
issues threatened the financial reform bill. Disagreements
arose on which banks would have to follow CRA's community-lending guidelines and how often they would be
examined.27
Also, Senator Phil Gramm was disturbed about
CRA issues claiming that even frivolous protests on CRA
grounds can delay bank mergers or expansions. 28 Additionally, banks have taken to paying community groups
to go away. Gramm supported a legislative "sunshine"
provision requiring banks to reveal payments to community groups. These groups then must reveal how they
spend the money.29
For the most part, Congress ignored the views of
consumer advocates. Some sunshine disclosure and filing
requirements are imposed concerning bank dealings with
community groups. The new Act provides for reduced
CRA compliance review for banks with less than $250
million in assets and good CRA ratings."
There is, however, some broadening of CRA obligations. For instance, the Federal Reserve Board may not
approve the formation of a holding company that will
form subsidiaries in non-banking businesses if any of the
insured depository institutions in the system received
poor CRA ratings.31
The prospects for future debate on CRA issues
Ralph Nader said that Congress caved to Senate
Banking Committee Chairman Phil Gramm who has
conducted a long, vitriolic attack on the Community
Reinvestment Act and the low- and moderate-income
and minority citizens who organize community organizations.32
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Debate about CRA policies continues. The Houston Chronicle of November 12, 1999, reported,
Critics say banking regulators are no longer
serious about enforcing the Community
Reinvestment Act ...And they argue that
what is already lax supervision is about to
be weakened further.. [C]ritics such as John
Henneberger, co-director of the Texas Low
Income Housing Information Center, say
the new [financial services reform law] will
send a signal 'that the Community Reinvestment Act is not going to be enforced as
vigorously as it has been.'33
The following section will now move from pocketbook issues to broader systemic issues affecting the
economy as a whole.
B. Systemic Issues
Core issues of the recently passed Financial Services Modernization Act concern the appropriate extent
of government regulation of the financial institutions
crucial to the U.S. economy as a whole. One such question is whether broadening the business that banks can
do puts the nation's system of Federal Deposit Insurance
at risk.
A broader question is whether permitting conglomerate firms to pursue banking, insurance, and securities business will lead to financial behemoths that are
too big to fail. In other words, these companies would be
so crucial to the national economy that government will
inevitably be forced to subsidize their bail out from
business failures at taxpayer expense. If so, what should
be done about it?
Of course, the recent reform legislation does not
eliminate all restrictions on what bank-based businesses
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may do. In general, they will not be permitted to do
business beyond banking, insurance, and securities. That
raises the question of whether the government's continuing restrictions that keep banks out of other businesses
(for example, manufacturing) are reasonable.

Consumer advocates and systemic issues
The issues that affect the health of the economic
system as a whole are of great importance to consumer
advocates. If the U.S. economy were to weaken or collapse because of poorly considered regulation, the suffering that would follow dwarfs the consequences of high
bank fees, privacy problems, or weak community lending
practices.
Systemic issues are difficult challenges for advocates. It is hard to guess in advance just what the nature
and extent of financial institution regulation needs to be
to keep the economy healthy. Harm from inadequate
regulation is contingent on financial institution failures
that might or might not happen. Because the possible
harm to consumers and taxpayers is not immediate, the
harm is difficult for advocates to explain to the public.
Not all consumer advocates took on broad systemic issues in the recent Congressional debate of financial reform. Ralph Nader was perhaps the most noticeable consumer participant.
1. FederalDeposit Insurance Issues -- Does Reform Legislation
Put FDIC Funds Under Great Stress?
Arguments made to Congress
While testifying to Congress in February 1999,
Ralph Nader argued that after large past failures in
savings and loan and commercial banks, "ITIhere was an
implicit promise.. .that new risks would not be added to
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deposit insurance and the federal safety net without
commensurate strengthening of regulation. HR 10 [financial services reform legislation] does not keep that promise. " 3' He added, "It would be shameful for this Committee to provide for trillion dollar conglomerates and leave
taxpayers protected by the current rickety, overlapping
and inadequate regulatory apparatus."35
Ralph Nader believes that financial institutions
that have the benefit of Federal Deposit Insurance should
be closely regulated to prevent risky behavior, thus
avoiding putting FDIC funds in jeopardy.36 He supports
the approach of existing statutes that limit risky bank
behavior.37 For example, in 1991 Congress enacted the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvements
Act ("FDICIA"), a system of early regulatory intervention
in the operation of banks with insufficient capital. 38 This
legislation is intended to reduce the cost of failures to the
FDIC. In 1994, Congress amended the FDICIA to provide
that Government bail-out of banks should stay within the
bounds of paying the losses of insured depositors to the
39
extent of the prescribed $100,000 payment limit.
FDIC related issues were a source of mildly contentious Congressional testimony by Alan Greenspan of
the Federal Reserve Board, on the one hand, and Treasury Secretary Rubin, on the other. Some of their comments addressed the same sort of safety and soundness
concerns discussed by Nader, particularly whether permitting banks to be in new businesses would put greater
stress on FDIC insurance of bank deposits. A May 1999
press report explained that the Federal Reserve has
argued for a holding company structure for new financial
services firms. Dr. Greenspan believes more risky businesses such as investment banking and securities underwriting should be done under a holding company structure, through affiliates.' He is trying to keep a bank's
riskier businesses at arm's length from the insured consumer deposits. But Mr. Rubin [then Secretary of the
Treasury], representing the Clinton Administration,
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believes that financial services companies should be able
to decide for themselves whether to conduct new businesses such as investment banking and underwriting
through operating subsidiaries.4'
The tone of Alan Greenspan's testimony to Congress was sometimes quite strong:
The Board believes that any version of
financial modernization legislation that
authorizes banks to conduct in their subsidiaries any activity as principal that is prohibited to the bank itself, is potentially a
step backward to greater federal subsidization [of the bank's business]...I and my
colleagues, accordingly, are firmly of the
view that the long-term stability of U.S.
financial markets and the interests of the
American taxpayer would be better served
by no financial modernization bill rather
than one that allows the proposed new
activities to be conducted by the bank ...42
The Financial Services Reform Act of 1999 represents a compromise between the Treasury and Federal
Reserve Board views. Obviously, neither Agency has
expressed public criticism of the compromise. It does
appear that the Federal Reserve Board largely prevailed
in its insistence on some form of holding company structure that minimizes the draining effect of new bank
43
businesses on FDIC funds.
The prospects for future debate on stress caused the FDIC by
broadened bank business
Whether the FDIC structure is sufficient to meet
the stress of future bank failures is a matter for conjecture. Future broad public debate of stress on FDIC funds
will most likely be triggered only if there are great bank
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failures and drain of FDIC funds.
The public did notice when banks failed and FDIC
funds were drained in the relatively recent past. In the
early 1980's, Continental Illinois was among the banks
the U.S. Government bailed out. That bail out reportedly
caused the FDIC a loss of $1.7 billion in 1984. 4 In 1988,
the FDIC rescued the nation's 13th largest bank holding
company, First Republic Bank Corp., in a package reportedly worth $5 billion.45
Current concerns about stress on the FDIC are
minor by comparison, but there are some who fear that
the number of U.S. bank failures is spiking. Worse, the
costs are skyrocketing: Seven failures so far this year will
cost the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. $864 million,
the biggest loss since 1992. 4 Reporter Mike McNamee
observed, "If bank regulators can't do better during these
fat times at fixing troubled banks -- or taking prompt
action to shut them down -- the next downturn in the
economy could be ugly indeed. 47
McNamee's point applies to the discussion of
stress on the FDIC that could be caused by the entry of
banks into new businesses, as permitted by the new
Financial Services Modernization Act. If a downturn in
the economy leads to bank failures; if the FDIC has difficulty dealing with the failures; if narrow regulatory fixes
don't take hold; then the real possibility arises of a public
outcry about the sufficiency of FDIC related regulation.
An outcry could involve advocacy of increased regulation limiting the riskiness of the businesses in which
banks involve themselves.
2. "Too Big to Fail" Issues
Arguments made to Congress
In February 1999, Deborah Goldberg of the Center
for Community Change expressed to Congress the common perception that financial reform legislation will lead
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to mergers. 4' These mergers would then result in large
conglomerate financial institutions that the government
would protect from financial failure. 49 Broadening the
authority for banks and other types of financial services
firms to affiliate with one another is likely to result in
unprecedented levels of concentration and consolidation
within our financial system, giving rise to a handful of
superbanks ° She predicted that the massive financial
conglomerates promoted by this bill will surely be
judged by the regulators to be "too big to fail." 51
Ms. Goldberg thinks existing legal limitations on
too big to fail financial institution bailouts may be illusory: "Although technically non-bank affiliates should be
allowed to fail in an economic crunch, we question
whether the proposed firewalls will be adequate to withstand the heat."52
The prospects for future debate on "too big to fail" concerns
The prospects for future debate are reviewed in
Barbara Rehm's American Banker article titled "Reform
Law Leaves The 'Too Big' Picture Too Fuzzy, Critics
Say."53 She writes, "It is common sense that the Government simply would not let a big financial firm collapse." 4 House Banking Committee Chairman Jim Leach
said "The too big to fail problem exists in modem-day
'5
financial services despite all desires to the contrary.
That is, while there are legal constraints on Government
help to failing institutions, those legal limitations will
have little practical effect in the event of a great financial
crunch.-6
The Financial Services Modernization Act itself
notes the need to avoid application of "too big to fail"
doctrine, and insures future discussion. The new law
gives the Fed and the Treasury until May 12, 2001, to
recommend ways Congress could use the market to
discipline large banks and limit risk of bank failure. One
example is to require large banks and their parent com-
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panies to hold some portion of their capital as subordinated debt.
3. Should Banks Be Permitted to Reach for Businesses beyond
Commercial Banking, Securities, and Insurance?
Arguments made to Congress
The Financial Services Modernization Act generally precludes banks from businesses beyond commercial
banking, securities, and insurance, and so erects a barrier
between banking and commerce. s7
Ralph Nader testified,
The great concern about mixing banking
and commerce, of course, is the potential
for banks to make credit decisions on the
basis of incestuous corporate relationships,
rather than on credit worthiness. Such
combinations ultimately would lead to a
concentration of banking and economic
resources as well as creating lending decisions that could damage safety and soundness of insured banks and place taxpayersupported deposit insurance funds at risk."
Mary Griffin of Consumers Union testified to a
similar effect, pointing out the potential that combining
banking with commercial enterprise would skew the
availability of credit, raise conflict of interest issues, and
risk over-expanding the reach of the safety net provided
to banks by the government. 9
The prospects for future debate on universal banking
In testimony to Congress, Federal Reserve Board
Chair Alan Greenspan explained that the current expansion of banking into securities underwriting and insur-
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ance is a tentative step toward universal banking, where
banks are permitted to engage in all sorts of commerce:
It seems to us wise to move first toward the
integration of banking, insurance, and
securities as envisaged in H.R. 10, and
employ the lessons we learn from that
important step before we consider whether
and under what conditions it would be
desirable to move to the second stage of full
60
integration of commerce and banking.
Greenspan explains that some caution about
universal banking is appropriate, as international experience with universal banking has been concerning:
Nothing is lost, in my judgment, by making
this a two-stage process. Indeed, there is
much to be gained. The Asian crisis last
year highlighted some of the risks that can
rise if relationships between banks and
commercial firms are too close and make
caution at this stage prudent, in our judgment.6 '
C. Putting the Issues in Context
The consumer issues discussed in this article may
be difficult to resolve. Bankers may have little incentive
to agree to substantial government intervention to resolve particular issues, and the government may find no
need to impose regulations. Great public concern could
create pressure for new regulation, but recently the public has shown little interest in bank regulation issues. The
lack of public engagement is discussed below. That
discussion is followed by consideration of the broad
regulatory philosophies that inform consumer advocacy
on particular issues.
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1. The Disengagementof the Publicfrom Banking Issues
The recent Financial Services Modernization Act
was enacted after acrimonious debate mainly involving
the affected financial institution interests -- banking,
insurance and brokerage houses. A member of The Wall
Street Journal editorial board approved of the new financial institution reform legislation as pure, unpasteurized
special interest legislation:
Does anyone think the U.S. Congress would
have gotten off its duff without the continuous and concentrated applications of lobbying and PAC money? There aren't enough
votes in banking reform to swing a lifeguard election in Greenland in the wintertime, let alone a congressional race. If it
were up to soccer moms, angry white men,
victims of color and other voting blocs
identified by pollsters, American legislators
would never have found time, even in 200
62
years, to write a banking law.
There was greater public involvement when the
recently repealed Depression era law was enacted in the
1930s. The Glass-Steagall Act has often been likened to "a
scapegoat" law--one that fed collective fears that banks
engaging in risky stock market speculations were ultimately responsible for the Wall Street crash of 1929 and
the economic misery that followed in its wake. 63 By 1933,
when Glass-Steagall was passed, a quarter of American
workers were unemployed, and 11,000 banks -- a third of
the country's total -- had failed. 64
The 1930s experience suggests that if our relatively
placid national economy goes bad, the public may again
focus on bankers as a cause of the economic downturn. If
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so, a regime of reduced bank regulation born in our
period of low economic stress may be challenged. A bad
national economy increases the possibility of increased
public interest in the economy, increased public hostility
toward banking interests, and public pressure to regulate
banking, as happened in the 1930s.
2. Broad Issues of FinancialInstitution Deregulation
This article has focused on particular debates
between consumer and bank interests that are really part
of a broader debate. The broader debate is about the need
for regulation of financial services. Arguably, the attention of the public is better engaged by explicitly tying
arguments on particular consumer issues to more general
points on the need for regulation. Some consumer advocates appear to take that view; others do not. Some consumer advocates who recently addressed Congress
advocated a broad and rigorous regulatory regime, while
others tended to present particular issues as separate and
distinct. Consumer advocate Ralph Nader was, for example, emphatic in relating his advocacy on particular
issues to broader advocacy of an aggressive regulatory
regime.
Robert Litan's 1998 book American Financefor the
5
2 1st Century" provides a touchstone for identifying the
broad regulation issues that divide consumer advocates
and bankers. Litan's view is that government regulation
of financial services should be sharply limited and honed
to well-defined purposes.' His points follow the basic
idea that a regulatory solution of a problem is to be
avoided unless market mechanisms fail. Any regulation
should be limited and interfere with the market as little
as possible.
For example, concerning government regulation to
prevent recurrence of something like the 1929 stock
market crash and the ensuing Depression of the 1930s,
Litan tells us that it is the safety of the financial system,
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rather than any particular bit of it that must concern
government regulators.67 So the question is how to let
individuals and companies make financial decisions that
suit their needs, while still making sure that the system
as a whole operates with an ample margin of safety if the
worst happens. 6
In Litan's view, what regulators need to address is
the possibility of a sudden, unusually unexpected, event
that disrupts the financial markets, and thus the efficient
channeling of resources, quickly enough and on a large
enough scale to cause a significant loss to the real
economy.69 Disruption of financial markets could occur
because of mishaps affecting, as examples, mutual funds,
commercial paper, uninsured bank deposits, debts of
countries as a whole (like Mexico), or the stock market.
He suggests that it is desirable to move away from
the high regulation regimen born of the Great Depression
of the 1930's and instead reduce regulation.
The goal of financial services regulation
should be sharply limited: to isolate and
contain mishaps, localizing, and so minimizing, the system wide effects of crashes.
Emphasis would shift toward early quarantine of problem cases, rather than last
minute rescues; toward the use of timely
information, rather than just flat mandates,
as a safety system; towards buffers and
shock absorbers designed by market participants and enforced by the marketplace
as well as by the government, rather that
one-size-fits-all standards enforced by
regulators. 70
Litan's is obviously not the only possible overview
of financial services regulation. Some think he recommends too much regulation, others want more. Consumer advocates would seem to generally be in the
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group that would like more vigorous regulation. Ralph
Nader is an example of a consumer advocate who argues
with vehemence for vigorous regulation of banking.
Questions about the nature and optimal extent of
financial services regulation are difficult. Financial services markets operate in ways dramatically different than
even a few years ago. For example, today ordinary
people put money into uninsured stock funds and other
speculative investments that might once have been put in
federally insured savings accounts. New investment
vehicles, such as derivatives, have novel potential for loss
of investor money. As Litan puts it, "perhaps all that can
be said with certainty is that the next system shaking
crisis-if there is one-is likely to look different than any
that has gone before."71

Conclusion
Many of the consumer issues aired in debate of the
new Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 are
unresolved. It seems likely that argument of the issues
will continue. It is not clear that the issues will resolve
quickly or easily. Bankers may have little incentive to
agree to regulation to resolve particular issues, and the
government may see little need for new regulation. Great
public concern could create pressure to impose regulation, but great public concern can take a long time to
develop, or never develop at all. Public concern is more
likely to develop if general economic conditions worsen,
and or if there are crises relevant to particular issues.
However, resolution of issues in a crisis environment is
not ideal. Resolution of issues in a crisis environment
facilitates political opportunism that can lead to unfortunate regulation.
The challenge to government is to achieve a regime
of well-reasoned financial regulation that balances legitimate interests of consumers and the desire of business to
avoid the fetters of unnecessary regulation. It should
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advance that goal to include a well-informed and engaged public in the ongoing policy debates. Public debate
on particular issues might be enhanced if it included a
broader dialogue about financial services regulation
policy.

Endnotes
1. Views expressed in this article are the responsibility of
the author, and are not necessarily the same as views of the
Antitrust Division, United States Department of Justice.
2. S. 900, H.R. 10

1 06 th Cong.

(1999) (enacted).

3. See Glass Steagall Act, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162
(1933).
4. See Hearingon H.R. 10 - The Fin. Services Act of 1998 Before
Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 1 05 th Cong.
(1998) (statement of Ralph Nader, Consumer Advocate).
5. See id.
6. Full Comm. Hearing on Fin. Modernization Before House
Comm. on Banking and Fin. Services, 1 0 6 h Cong. (1999) (statement of Mary Griffin, Insurance Counsel, Consumers
Union).
7. See id.
8. See Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, Pub.
L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338, 702 (electronic fund transfer
fee disclosures at any host ATM).
9. See Dean Anason, Clinton Calls for Low-Cost Accounts for
Wage Earners,AM. BANKER, Jan. 14, 2000, at 2.

Volume 12, Number 4 2000

Loyola Consumer Law Review

10. See Albert Crenshaw, Cash Flow, When It Doesn't Pay to
Stay; Make Change if Your Bank Is Nickel-and-DimingYou, AM.
BANKER, Nov. 14, 1999, at H02.
11. Olaf de Senerpont Domis, Oppositionto ATM Fees Spreading Coast to Coast, AM. BANKER, Nov. 17, 1999, at 4.
12. Robert D. Hershey, Jr., Donald G. Ogilvie: Users May Be
Shortchanged if Ban on ATM Fees, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1999,
sec. 3 at 4.
13. See Benita M. Dodd, Conversation Starter: Are ATM
ChargesJustified, ATLANTA J. CONST., Nov. 13, 1999, at 18A.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See Fin.Institutions Subcomm. Hearingon Fin. PrivacyBefore House Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. and Consumer Credit, 1 0 6 th
Cong. (1999) (statement of Edmund Mierzwinski, Consumer Program Director, U.S. Public Interest Research
Group).
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, Pub. L.
No. 106-102,113 Stat. 1338, (1999) (obligations with respect
to disclosures of personal information).
22. Robert O'Harrow, Jr., A Postscripton Privacy; Bank Bill's

Loyola Consumer Law Review

Volume 12, Number 4 2000

Late Change Gives States Last Word, WASH. POST, Nov. 5,1999,
at E01.
23. Dean Anason, Consumer Privacy Laws May Be Set to
Spread Like Wildfire in States, Am. BANKER, Dec. 6, 1999, at 1.
24. See id.
25. Full Comm. Hearingon Fin. Modernization Before House
Comm. on Banking and Fin. Services, X06th Cong. (1999) (statement of Mary Griffin, Insurance Counsel, Consumers
Union).
26. See id.
27. See Clifford Glickman, Community-Lending Provisions
TRIB. Bus.
NEWS, Oct. 29, 1999.

Nearly Sank Financial Reform Bill, KNIGHT-RIDDER
28. See id.

29. See Ode to a Scapegoat, WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 1999, sec. A at
26.
30. See Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, Pub.
L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338,_ 809 (small bank regulatory
relief).
31. See Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, Pub.
L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338,_ 103 (financial activities).
32. See Ralph Nader, Outlook: These Banking 'Reforms' Are a
Menace to Consumers, HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 7, 1999, at 4.
33. See id.
34. Full Comm. Hearing on Fin. Modernization Before House
Comm. on Banking and Fin. Services, 1 0 6 hCong. (1999) (state-

Volume 12, Number 4 2000

Loyola Consumer Law Review

ment of Ralph Nader, Consumer Advocate).
35. Id.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvements Act (FDICIA)_ 141 (a), 12 U.S.C._ 1823(c)(4)(E)(i)
(1994).
39. See id.
40. See Joanne Gray, John Fairfax Group Pty Ltd, AUSTRAMay 7, 1999.

LIAN FINANCIAL REVIEW,

41. See id.
42. Hearing on H.R. 10 and Fin. Modernization Before the
Subcomm. on Fin. and HazardousMaterialsof the House Comm.
on Commerce, 1 0 6 th Cong. (1999) (statement of Alan
Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys.).
43. See Clyde Mitchell, H.R. 10 - So Near and Yet So Far,
N.Y.L.J., Oct. 21, 1998 at 6.
44. See Winston Williams, U.S. Puts Together $7.5 Billion in
Aid for Illinois Bank, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1984, sec. A at 1.
45. See Kathleen Day and John M. Berry, FDIC Rescues Texas
Bank with $1 Billion Loan, WASH. PosT, Mar. 18, 1988, at B1.
46. See Mike McNamee, Bank Watchdogs Need to Use the Teeth
They Have, Bus. WK., Dec. 13, 1999, at 50.
47. Id.

Loyola Consumer Law Review

Volume 12, Number 4 2000

48. See Full Comm. Hearingon FinancialModernization
Before House Comm. on Banking and Fin. Services, 1 0 6th
Cong. (1999) (statement of Deborah Goldberg, Center for
Community Change).
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. Id.
53. Barbara A. Rehm, Reform Law Leaves the 'Too Big'
PictureToo Fuzzy, AM. BANKER, Nov. 29, 1999, at 3.
54. See id.
55. Id.
56. Id.

57. See Kelly Childs, Millennium Milestones, INDEP. BANKER,
Dec. 1, 1999.
58. Full Comm. Hearing on Fin. Modernization Before House
Comm. on Banking and Fin. Services, 1 0 6 th Cong. (1999) (statement of Ralph Nader, Consumer Advocate).
59. See id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Holman Jenkins, Jr., Hooray for Special Interest Money,
J., Oct. 28, 1999.

ASIAN WALL ST.

Volume 12, Number 4 2000

Loyola Consumer Law Review

63. See Sam Ali, Congress Tears Down Wall Separating
Banks, Brokerages,Insurers, KNIGHT-RIDDER TRIB. Bus. NEWS,
Nov. 7, 1999.
64 See id.
65.

ROBERT

FOR THE

E.

LITAN

& JONATHAN RAUCH, AMERICAN FINANCE

21 CENTURY (Brookings Institution Press 1998).

66. See id at 140.
67. See id.
68. See id. at 117.
69. See id.
70. See id. at 140.
71. See id. at 137.

Loyola Consumer Law Review

F]

Volume 12, Number 4 2000

